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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by Order of the Utah Supreme Court 
dated May 13th, 2003 and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001) and § 78-2-
2(4) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether, given all the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom, taken in a light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, Plaintiffs/Appellant's Complaint is sufficient 
as a matter of law to maintain a civil action against Defendants/Appellees for 
intentionally interfering with Plaintiffs/Appellant's prospective economic relations and 
therefore the trial court erred in granting Defendants/Appellees Motion to dismiss? A 
copy of the Order granting the Defendants/Appellees Motion to Dismiss is included in the 
Addendum. (R. at 113-114). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted shall be treated as one for summary judgment Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, the court views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the losing party and in deciding whether the trial court 
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properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing party, the court gives no 
deference to the trial court's view of the law; it is reviewed for correctness. Ron Case 
Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). At 
issue is the correctness of the lower court's decision to grant the Defendants/Appellee's 
motion for dismissal, applying a de novo review in which no deference is granted to the 
trial court's ruling. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(a)(1), 12(b)(6), 56(c) 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-l-501(2)(b), § 58-l-501(2)(h), § 58-67-501(l)(c)(i), § 58-67-
502, § 78-2-2(3)0, § 78-2-2(4), § 78-27-42 (1986). 
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ORDER OF THE 
LOWER COURT APPEALED FROM 
This case involved an action for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations by the Plaintiff/Appellant Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. against the 
Defendants/Appellees Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert Peterson, M.D. 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman had been dismissed from the action on pursuant to a 
settlement agreement and subsequent Order of Dismissal With Prejudice filed with the 
district court on October 23rd, 2002. (R. at 91-92). The action was therefore against 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Robert Peterson. This appeal is from an Order dated December 
2 
5 , 2002 by the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henroid, Third District Court, State of Utah, 
Salt Lake County, granting the Defendant/Appellee Dr. Robert Peterson's Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (R. at 113). A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on 
December 26th, 2002 and on December 30th, 2002 the Utah Court of Appeals transferred 
the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). (R. at 
103-106). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on May 13th, 2003 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Mediation was 
unsuccessful and on January 13 , 2004 the Utah Court of Appeals issued a letter setting 
the briefing schedule. Defendant/Appellee Peterson filed a Motion to Strike Appellant's 
Brief on April 15th, 2004. On May 5th, 2004 the Honorable William A. Thome Jr. 
ordered that Defendant/Appellee Peterson's Motion to Strike Appellant's Brief be granted 
and further ordered that the Plaintiff/Appellant could file a compliant brief within thirty 
days of the Order. (See Addendum 1). 
STATEMENT FACTS 
The Defendants/Appellees are both licensed physicians specializing in the 
practice of neurosurgery. (R. at 64). Both Defendants/Appellees maintain active staff 
privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. at 64). The 
Defendants/Appellees are also partners acting under the business name Neurosurgical 
Associates, L.L.C. (R. at 64). Defendant/Appellee Dr. Mark Reichman is the Chief of 
the Neurosurgery Division at LDS Hospital. (R. at 64). 
The Plaintiff/Appellant is a licensed physician specializing in orthopedic 
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surgery and who also maintains active staff privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (R. at 64). In the normal course of their respective businesses, the 
Defendants/Appellees and the Plaintiff/Appellant are competitors for certain types of 
surgical patients seeking treatment for spinal disorders. (R. at 64). 
The Plaintiff/Appellant is a contracted provider for IHC Health Plans. (R. at 
64-65). This contract requires that the Plaintiff/Appellant maintain staff privileges at an 
IHC facility and also requires that certain patients with IHC Health Plans medical 
insurance be treated at an IHC facility such as LDS Hospital. (R. at 65). The contract 
between IHC Health Plans and the Plaintiff/Appellant also provides in part that the 
Plaintiff/Appellant will provide surgical services for IHC Health Plans beneficiaries in 
exchange for IHC Health Plans paying for those services. (R. at 65). 
At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically utilize three surgical 
microscopes for spine procedures and other orthopedic and neurosurgical procedures: a 
newer model Zeiss surgical microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and an older model 
Zeiss surgical microscope. (R. at 65). These microscopes are owned by the hospital as 
capital equipment. (R. at 66). The Defendants/Appellees have never disputed that the 
Leica and newer Zeiss microscopes are superior in quality to the older Zeiss. (R. at 65). 
These superior qualities allow for increased safety for the patients during various surgical 
procedures. (R. at 65). 
The Plaintiff/Appellant began practicing at LDS Hospital and utilized the 
operative microscopes for certain procedures when they were available in the normal 
course of his practice. (R. at 66). On May 23rd, 2001 the Plaintiff/Appellant had a 
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surgical case scheduled in one of the LDS operating rooms. (R. at 66). 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman indicated that the Plaintiff/Appellant was not allowed 
to use either of the two newer microscopes, as they were for the exclusive use of the 
Defendants/Appellees and the other members of the Neurosurgery Division as well as 
neurosurgery resident physicians in training. (R. at 66). On June 1st, 2001 the 
Plaintiff/Appellant sent a letter to Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman pointing out that the 
use of the higher quality operative microscopes for certain procedures was in the interests 
of delivering the highest possible patient care and that it was also important for patient 
safety. (R. at 66). The Plaintiff/Appellant explained that the he was experienced in the 
use of operative microscopes and qualified to do so. (R. at 66). The letter requested Dr. 
Reichman to change his position as to who he thought could appropriately use this 
equipment. (R. at 66). 
Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this request and instead asserted to 
the operating room staff that he had the authority to restrict the use of the surgical 
microscopes, that they belonged to the neurosurgery division and that the 
Plaintiff/Appellant was forbidden to use them. (R. at 66). Plaintiff/Appellant contacted 
the Chief of Surgery for LDS Hospital (Dr. Doty). (R. at 67). Plaintiff/Appellant 
requested clarification as to who in fact owned and controlled the operating room 
equipment at LDS Hospital. (R. at 67). On July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff/Appellant met 
with the Chief of Surgery for LDS Hospital to discuss the issue. (R. at 67). At this 
meeting Dr. Doty confirmed that all of the surgical microscopes in LDS Hospital's 
operating rooms were owned by LDS Hospital and he indicated and that it would be 
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acceptable and appropriate for Plaintiff/Appellant to use these surgical microscopes. (R. 
at 67). Defendants/Appellees responded in writing to Robert Cash, Assistant 
Administrator for the Urban Central Region at LDS Hospital stating that "[t]he 
neurosurgery department is very busy and cannot provide adequate coverage for the 
neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are not available or being used 
by other services." (R. at 67). This letter also states that "[t]he neurosurgeons have met 
in this regard and the opinions are unanimous." . (R. at 67-68). Defendant/Appellee Dr. 
Robert Peterson's name also appeared on this letter indicating that he was acting in 
concert with Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman. (R. at 67-68). 
On September 17 , 2001 the Plaintiff/Appellant was waiting in the surgeons 
lounge at LDS Hospital to start a spinal surgical procedure in operating room Five. (R. at 
68). Plaintiff/Appellant was specifically waiting for Defendant/Appellee Dr. Robert G. 
Peterson to finish his neurosurgical case in that room. (R. at 68). After 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson finished his case he came into the lounge where the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, a physicians assistant, and an otorhinolaryngologist surgeon with 
whom Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson was friendly with were sitting. (R. at 68). 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson had never met the Plaintiff/Appellant before this and 
was therefore unaware of who he was. (R. at 68). 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson began talking to this otorhinolaryngologist. 
(R. at 68). He wanted to know if the otorhinolaryngologist needed a microscope for his 
case. (R. at 68). Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson encouraged this surgeon to use the 
microscope from room Five for his ENT procedure so that the Plaintiff/Appellant, who 
6 
was scheduled to perform his surgical procedure in Room Five after Defendant/Appellee 
Dr. Peterson was finished, would not have it available for his case. (R. at 68). 
Defendant/Appellee went on to state that he, himself, should "run that scope out" as "a 
banned surgeon" was following him in operating room Five. (R. at 68). 
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff/Appellant utilized the 
Leica and newer Zeiss microscope without apparent problems. (R. at 69). Also during 
this time period both of the Defendants/Appellees continued to assert to the operating 
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority to restrict access to the 
surgical microscopes. (R. at 69). This was a direct and intentional attempt to keep the 
Plaintiff/Appellant from rightfully using this equipment. (R. at 69). 
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants/Appellees wrote a letter to the Chief of Surgery 
for LDS Hospital implying that the Plaintiff/Appellant had damaged and disassembled 
the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s). (R. at 69). Defendants/Appellees 
claimed that Plaintiff/Appellant had caused a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes 
and as a result of this, treatment of neurosurgery patients to be compromised and, 
operating room time and stress to be increased. (R. at 69). The Plaintiff/Appellant 
claimed that these statements were fraudulent. (R. at 74). Defendants/Appellees 
continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict access to the microscopes 
Plaintiff/Appellant wanted to use. (R. at 69). Specifically, Defendant/Appellee Dr. 
Robert Peterson's name and signature are on this letter. (R. at 69). 
On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff/Appellant had a patient scheduled for a 
significant surgical procedure. (R. at 71). In the interests of quality assurance and patient 
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safety the use of the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was necessary. (R. at 71). 
When the Plaintiff/Appellant came to the operating room he was told that 
Defendants/Appellees were insistent that he could not use the newer Zeiss or the Leica 
microscopes notwithstanding the fact that at least one of these microscopes was available 
for use on that day and at that time. (R. at 71). Plaintiff/Appellant asked Dusty Clegg, 
the operating room manager, what his options were and to request a suggestion on how to 
best handle the problem. (R. at 71). Dusty Clegg recommended that Plaintiff/Appellant 
call the Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman as Chief of Neurosurgery and if that was 
unproductive to call hospital administration. (R. at 71). The Plaintiff/Appellant called 
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman and informed him that he needed to use one of the 
newer microscopes and that it was available without interfering with any other scheduled 
procedures. (R. at 71). Dr. Reichman, without discussion, refused to change his assertion 
that he would not allow Plaintiff/Appellant use of the newer microscopes. (R. at 71). 
Plaintiff/Appellant therefore called Dr. William Hamilton, Medical Director, IHC Urban 
and Central Region, to explain the situation in brief. (R. at 71-72). Dr. Hamilton, after 
deliberation and a phone call to Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman informed 
Plaintiff/Appellant through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the microscope in question. 
(R. at 72). Plaintiff/Appellant felt that given the nature of the surgical procedure, in the 
interests of patient safety, the proposed procedure must be cancelled. (R. at 72). 
On July 3rd, 2002 the Plaintiff/Appellant called Dr. Hamilton requesting 
information and clarification on the events of the previous day. (R. at 72). Dr. Hamilton 
apologized for the outcome and said that the hospital was dependent on the neurosurgical 
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service to provide level one trauma care and they were currently in negotiations with Dr. 
Reichman regarding the issue of neurosurgical trauma coverage. (R. at 72). He at no 
time stated that the neurosurgical division had the authority to restrict access to the 
microscope nor did he state that any of the allegations made by the Defendants/Appellees 
regarding damaged or disassembled equipment were true. (R. at 72). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant need only prove facts to support two issues in order to 
maintain his action: 
A. Accepting the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Plaintiff/Appellant can maintain an action for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations against the Defendants/Appellees. 
B. Defendants/Appellees acted in concert and as one party thereby equally sharing 
liability for their actions and the fact that Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman was 
dismissed from the action does not release Defendant/Appellee Peterson. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. The Defendant/Appellee Peterson claims that not only is Plaintiffs/Appellant's 
claim defective as a matter of law but, that the sole allegation in his complaint against 
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him is that "he once referred to Dr. Brown as a 'banned surgeon.'" (R. at 51). In fact, the 
Plaintiff s/Appellant's claims are comprehensive and very clear. Plaintiff/Appellant 
claims that through a series of systematic and consistent actions, both of the defendants 
intentionally used improper means to restrict access to essential hospital equipment 
thereby interfering with the prospective economic relations of the Plaintiff/Appellant and 
causing injury to the Plaintiff/Appellant. (R. at 31). The Plaintiff/Appellant also 
demanded a specific judgment amount for damages. (R. at 33). More detail than this is 
not required as the Plaintiffs/Appellant's claim need only contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(1). 
Defendant/Appellee Peterson admits in his Memorandum Supporting 
Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for a More 
Definite Statement that Utah law recognizes the tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations and cites Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293, 304 (Utah 1982). (R. at 52-53). The Court in Leigh Furniture (and similarly in 
Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993)) 
recognized a common-law cause of action for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations and adopted the Oregon definition of this tort. Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982). Under this definition, in order to 
recover damages, a Plaintiff must prove the following facts: (1) that the defendant 
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for 
10 
an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 304. 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, the court views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the losing party. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. 
v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). The facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, taken as required in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, support a 
claim for intentional interference with existing or potential economic relations under Utah 
law. 
1. DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES INTENTIONALLY INTERFERRED WITH 
THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS EXISTING OR POTENTIAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS. 
Defendant/ Appellees intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs/Appellant's 
existing or potential economic relations by wrongfully restricting his use of essential 
hospital owned equipment. The Defendants/Appellees do not deny the fact that there was 
intentional interference with the use of hospital owned equipment used in the course of 
certain surgical procedures. They directly and intentionally prevented Plaintiff/Appellant 
from utilizing vital equipment on July 2nd, 2002. (R. at 71.) Defendants/Appellees 
letters to Dr. Cash and Dr. Doty further demonstrate that the Defendants/Appellees were 
intentionally interfering with the Plaintiff/Appellants delivery of medical care. (R. at 67, 
69). Peterson's attempts at inducing another non-neurosurgeon to assist in his scheme of 
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interfering with the Plaintiffs/Appellant's use of vital equipment leaves no doubt as to 
intent. (R. at 68). Additionally, the Defendants/Appellees have not disputed their intent. 
The question then becomes one as to whether this interference was for improper purpose 
or through improper means. 
2. DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES INTERFERENCE WAS FOR AN 
IMPROPER PURPOSE AND THEY USED IMPROPER MEANS WHEN THEY 
INTENTIONALLY INTERFERED WITH THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS 
EXISTING OR POTENTIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant is in the business of performing certain surgical 
procedures some of which, for patient safety reasons require the use of operating 
microscopes. (R. at 64, 75). The Plaintiff has a contract with IHC Health Plans. (R. at 
65). In order to perform his obligations under this contract the Plaintiff/Appellant must 
provide surgical services to IHC Health Plans beneficiaries. (R. at 65). In order to 
provide certain procedures the operative microscope is vital. (R. at 75). The prospective 
economic relationship is in the form of a contract between the Plaintiff/Appellant and 
IHC Health Plans. In exchange for the Plaintiff/Appellant performing surgery, the patient 
agrees to pay for those services either personally, or through a third party such as an 
insurance company. If competitors prevent the Plaintiff/Appellant from performing 
these procedures, there has been interference with his prospective economic relations. If 
this interference is intentional and involve improper means, then the interfering 
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competitors have participated in an actionable tort. 
Utah courts have decided that a defendant's improper intent, motive or purpose to 
interfere is a necessary element of the plaintiffs case, rather than a lack thereof being a 
matter of justification or privilege to be asserted as a defense by defendant. Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). Thus, to be entitled to 
go to a jury, Plaintiff/Appellant must not only prove that defendant intentionally 
interfered with his business relationship but also that defendant had a duty of non-
interference; i.e., that he interfered for an improper purpose rather than for a legitimate 
one, or that defendant used improper means which resulted in injury to plaintiff. Id at 
304. The requirement of improper means is satisfied where the means used to interfere 
with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, 
regulations, or recognized common-law rules. Id at 308. Such acts are illegal or tortious 
in themselves and hence are clearly "improper" means of interference. Id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-50l(l)(c)(i) provides that unlawful conduct includes 
".. .substantially interfering with a licensee's lawful and competent practice of medicine 
in accordance with this chapter by.. .any person or entity that manages, owns, operates, or 
conducts a business having a direct or indirect financial interest in the licensee's 
professional practice." Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-501(l)(c)(i) (2001). The 
Defendants/Appellees are competitors for certain surgical patients. (R. at 64). As 
competitors they have a business that has a direct or indirect financial interest in the 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's professional practice. Thus, if Defendants/Appellees as competing 
parties substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs/Appellant's lawful and competent 
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practice of medicine, they are in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-501(c)(i). Whether 
or not the Defendants/Appellees substantially interfered with the Plaintiff/Appellant's 
lawful and competent practice of medicine is a matter of fact, not law. Taken in a light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, the Court must find that the improper means 
element of tortuous interference with prospective economic relations has been satisfied. 
The improper means element of the Plaintiffs/Appellant's Claim is satisfied 
under the facts of this action. "Commonly included among improper means are violence, 
threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293, 308 (Utah 1982) citing Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 
1365, 1371 (Oregon 1978). Defendants/Appellees are neurosurgeons and LDS Hospital 
depends upon them for various neurosurgical services. (R. at 72). Defendants/Appellees 
used their position as neurosurgeons to intimidate the operating room staff by deceptively 
asserting to the operating room staff that they had the authority to restrict the use of the 
operating room microscopes. (R. at 70). Defendants/Appellees fraudulently implied that 
the Plaintiff/Appellant caused damage to equipment and delay in patient treatment. (R. at 
70). When the Defendants/Appellees used fraud and intimidation in furtherance of their 
scheme to interfere with the Plaintiff/Appellant they have acted improperly. As a matter 
of fact, taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, these statements are 
false and defamatory and therefore in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(h). 
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's claimed that the Plaintiff/Appellee was a "banned 
surgeon." (R. at 68). As a matter of fact, taken in a light most favorable to the 
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Plaintiff/Appellant, this statement is disparaging and false. Additionally, as a matter of 
fact, Defendant/Appellee Peterson's statements and actions were unprofessional and 
therefore in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(b), § 58-l-501(2)(h) and also 
therefore improper interference under guidelines established in Leigh Furniture. 
Under Leigh Furniture, "[M]eans" may also be improper or wrongful because they 
violate "an established standard of a trade or profession." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. 
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308 (Utah 1982). Defendant/Appellee Peterson's encouraged 
another (non-neurosurgeon) physician to utilize equipment exclusively for the purpose of 
interfering with the Plaintiffs/Appellant's use of that equipment. (R. at 68). As a matter 
of fact, taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, this behavior by 
Defendant/Appellee Peterson is a violation of ethical standards of medicine and because 
it is also unprofessional it is also a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-502(1996). 
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's attempt to persuade a non-neurosurgeon to aide in his 
scheme to interfere with Plaintiffs/Appellant's use of vital equipment is not only 
unethical and unprofessional but directly contradicts the Defendants'/Appellees' 
statement that the "neurosurgery service is very busy and cannot provide adequate 
coverage for the neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are not 
available or being used by other services" (emphasis added). (R. at 67). These facts 
indicate that the Defendants/Appellees were not so much interested in any legitimate or 
privileged protection of their practice, patients, or equipment but rather were solely 
interested in interfering with a competitor's ability to deliver safe and high quality health 
care. 
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Plaintiff/Appellant of providing surgical services to patients. (R. at 64). As a matter of 
fact, taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, Defendants/Appellees are 
experienced surgeons and as such knew that their actions would interfere with the 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's practice of medicine (and potential economic relations). However, 
even if a defendant does not act for the purpose of interfering or does not desire it but 
knows that the interference is substantially certain to occur as a result of a defendant's 
action and is a necessary consequence thereof, the interference is intentional. Mumford 
v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore 
Defendants/Appellees knew or should have known that interfering with the 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's ability to utilize essential equipment could and would cause 
measurable and significant economic damages to the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
B. Defendants/Appellees acted in concert and as one part)/ thereby equally sharing the 
liability for their actions and Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman's dismissal from the 
action pursuant to a settlement agreement does not release Defendant/Appellee Dr. 
Peterson. 
1. Defendants/Appellees are partners in a neurosurgical group practice. (R. at 
64). They hold out to the public that they are a group operating together under the name 
"Neurosurgical Associates." (R. at 64). Defendants/Appellees have not disputed that 
they acted as partners in their interference with the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
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2. The fact that Defendant/Appellant Reichman has been dismissed from the 
claim does not release Defendant/Appellant Peterson. A release given by a person 
seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant 
unless the release so provides. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 (1986). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is 
treated as one for summary judgment. Utah Rules of Civ. Procedure 12(b)(6). It is well 
established that a motion for summary judgment requires that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah Rules of Civ. Procedure 56(c). In a case of motion for summary judgment by the 
Defendant, the Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to him. 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989). 
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982). This 
decision and others, hold that in order to recover damages, a Plaintiff must prove the 
following facts: (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing 
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
causing injury to the plaintiff. The Plaintiff/Appellant's burdens for the purposes of this 
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appeal have therefore been met. The facts, taken in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff/Appellant provide ample evidence to easily support Plaintiffs/Appellant's 
Claim. The Plaintiff/Appellant is a business competitor for certain spine surgery patients. 
(R. at 20). Defendants/Appellees fraudulently asserted to the operating room staff that 
they had a controlling ownership interest in equipment that was in fact owned and 
controlled by the hospital. (R. at 69). Defendants/Appellees fraudulently implied that 
Plaintiff/Appellant damaged and disassembled equipment compromising patient care. (r. 
AT 69). Defendants/Appellees used their position as the sole providers of neurosurgical 
services to intimidate hospital staff and administrators in violation of Utah law in order to 
interfere with this competitor's business relations. (R. at 72). Defendant/Appellee 
Peterson attempted to coerce a non-neurosurgeon to help him in his scheme of interfering 
with Plaintiff/Appellant. (R. at 68). The Defendant's/Appellant's actions illustrates that 
their purpose was not for any legitimate purpose but rather for the purpose of improperly 
stifling the business of a competitor. Defendants '/Appellees' intimidation of the 
operating room staff led them to restrict access to vital equipment thereby forcing the 
Plaintiff/Appellant to cancel a surgical procedure valued at $18,296.50 thereby causing 
significant economic injury to the Plaintiff/Appellant. (R. at 72, 80). The 
Defendants/Appellees intentionally interfered with the Plaintiff s/Appellant's use of 
essential equipment. The Defendant's/Appellee's intent is demonstrated by numerous 
actions and written correspondences. The Defendants/Appellees interfered through fraud 
and unprofessional statements and actions indicating improper purpose and improper 
means. Defendants/Appellees actions caused Plaintiff/Appellant to cancel a surgical case 
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with significant value thereby causing injury to the Plaintiff/Appellant. The Third 
District Court erred in granting the Defendants '/Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and this 
decision should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May, 2004. 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Attorney, acting for himself 
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ADDENDUM 1: ORDERS 
1. ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF 
DEFENDANT MARK REICHMAN, M.D. (R. at 91-92) 
2. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PETERSON'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS (R. at 113-114) 
3. ORDER TRANSFERRING APPEAL TO THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT (R. at 106) 
4. ORDER TRANSFERRING APPEAL TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
5. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
PETERSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND GRANTING 
THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 30 DAYS TO FILE A 
COMPLIANT BRIEF 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. (#7693) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone (801) 541-5492 
Facsimile (801) 964-3436 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT 
PETERSON, M.D. 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT 
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. 
Case No. 020906986 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and joint motion for the dismissal, with 
prejudice, of Defendant Mark Reichman, M.D., on file herein, and with good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action and the Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint therein, are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, as to Defendant Mark 
Reichman, M.D. only. The parties have agreed to bear their respective costs and 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this day of _ , 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
STEPHEN L. HENRIO 
Third District Court Judgi 
BRUCE H/ JENSEN / 
Attorneyfor Defendant M Reichman, M.D. 
HAROLD L. REISER 
Attorney for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
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MlIB DISTRICT COUBf 
Third Judicial District 
Alan B. Brown (#7693) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801) 541-5492 
(801) 964-3436 fax 
Deputy~Clerk' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
Alau B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert 
Peterson, M.D. 
Defendants 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
DEFENDANT PETERSON 
Case No. 020906986 
The Honorable Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod 
Pursuant to a MINUTE ENTRY issued by the Honorable Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod on December 5th, 2002 granting the Defendant's (Peterson) MOTION TO 
DISMISS, on file herein, and with good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action and the Amended 
Complaint therein, is hereby dismissed, as to Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
i 
Dated this 11 of ftPfU4U . 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HAROLD REISER 
Attorney for the Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
ALAN BROWN, M.D., J.D. 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 3 0 2002 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D. , and 
Robert Peterson, M.D., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
District Court No. 020906986 
This matter is before the court on its own motion to 
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the 
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or 
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving 
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996) . See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) . A case number will be assigned by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Dated this oQ day of December, 2002. 
FOR THE COURT: 
V 
Paulette Stagg, Aj 
Clerk of the Court 
Dec,, ' s*-™ r 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 20021070-SC 
020906986 
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert 
Peterson, M.D., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, this matter 
is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. All 
further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that 
court. 
The address of the Utah Court of Appeals is: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Office of the Clerk 
450 S. State St. 
PO Box 140230 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0230 
FOR THE COURT: 
Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on May 13, 2003, a true and correct copy cf 
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the party(ies) listed below: 
ALAN B. BROWN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2240 PARLEYS TERRACE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
HAROLD L. REISER 
PARSONS KINGHORN & PETERS 
111 E BROADWAY STE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the trial court listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN/KATHY SHUPE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20021070-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 020906986 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
coOoo 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D., and 
Robert Peterson, M.D., 
Defendants. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 3 0 2002 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
District Court No. 02C906986 
This matter is before the court on its own motion to 
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the 
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or 
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving 
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996) . See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) , A case number will be assigned by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Dated this 
FOR THE COURT: 
^ day of December, 2002 
^ 
:>, 
w Pauiette 
Clerk of 
Stagg, 
the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^£) day of December, 2002, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail to the parties listed below: 
ALAN B. BROWN 
224 0 PARLEYS TERRACE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
HAROLD REISER 
185 S STATE ST STE 700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-1500 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE DEPT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this jQ day of December, 2002. 
Deputy Clerk 
District Court No.020906986 
ADDENDUM 2: RULES 
1. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(a)(1) 
2. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) 
3. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c) 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(a)(1) 
Rule 8(a)(a). General rules of pleadings, (a) Claims for relief. A pleading 
which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6) 
Rule 12(b)(6). Defenses and objections, (b) How presented. Every defense, in 
law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, .. .A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived 
by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or 
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party 
is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at 
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(c) 
Rule 56(c). Summary judgment: (c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with 
CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
ADDENDUM 3: STATUTES 
1. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-l-501(2)(b) (2001) 
2. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-1-501 (2)(h) (2001) 
3. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-67-50l(l)(c)(i) (2001) 
4. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-67-502 (2001) 
5. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001) 
6. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2-2(4) (1986) 
7. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-27-42 (1986) 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-1-501 (2001) 
§58-1-501. Unlawful and unprofessional conduct: (1) "Unlawful conduct11 
means conduct, by any person, that is defined as unlawful under this title.. .(2) 
"Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or applicant, that is 
defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule adopted 
under this title and includes: (a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other 
person to violate, any statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or 
profession under this title; (b) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person 
to violate, any generally accepted professional or ethical standard applicable to 
an occupation or profession regulated under this title;.. .(h) practicing or 
attempting to practice an occupation or profession requiring licensure under 
this title by any form of action or communication which is false, misleading, 
deceptive, or fraudulent... 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-501 (2001) 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-501 (2001) Unlawful conduct: (1) "Unlawful 
conduct" includes, in addition to the definition in Section 58-1-501: ...(c) 
substantially interfering with a licensee's lawful and competent practice of 
medicine in accordance with this chapter by: (i) any person or entity that 
manages, owns, operates, or conducts a business having a direct or indirect 
financial interest in the licensee's professional practice; or... 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-502 (1996) 
§ 58-67-502. Unprofessional conduct: "Unprofessional conduct" includes, in 
addition to the definition in Section 58-1-501, using or employing the services 
of any individual to assist a licensee in any manner not in accordance with the 
generally recognized practices, standards, or ethics of the profession, state law, 
or division rule. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(i) (2001) 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i). Supreme Court jurisdiction: .. .(3) The Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:...(j) 
orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction... 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (2001) 
§ 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction:.. .(4) The Supreme Court may transfer 
to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: (a) capital felony convictions or an 
appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; (b) election and voting contests; (c) reapportionment of election 
districts; (d) retention or removal of public officers; (e) matters involving 
legislative subpoenas; and (f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-42 (1986). 
§78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge other defendants. A 
release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not 
discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
ADDENDUM 4: RECORD 19-34 
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Alan B. Brown (#7693) 
At torney , a c t i n g for himself 
2240 Par leys Terrace 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84109 
(801) 541-5492 
(801) 964-3436 fax 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert 
Peterson, M.D. 
Defendants 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Case No. 
Judge 
Pursuant to URCP Rule 15(a), Plaintiff requests the Court 
accept this Amended Complaint and Jury Demand. The 
amendment consists of changing Claim (1) to read: "From May 
23rd, 2001 through the present, Defendants have used 
unprofessional and unethical conduct with the intent to 
interfere with the economic relations of the Plaintiff in 
violation of Utah Code 58-1-501 (2) (a), 58-1-501 (2) (b), and 
58-67-501(1)(c)(i) 
1 
Background: 
(1) The Defendants are both licensed physicians 
specializing in the practice of neurosurgery and they 
both maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant, Dr. Mark Reichman, 
is the Chief of the Neurosurgery Division at LDS 
Hospital. 
(2) The Plaintiff is a licensed physician specializing 
in orthopedic surgery and who also maintains active 
staff privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
(3) In the normal course of their respective 
businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are 
competitors for certain types of surgical patients 
seeking treatment for spinal disorders. 
(4) The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC 
Health Plans. This contract requires that the 
Plaintiff maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain 
Health Care facility. The Plaintiff has continued to 
maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff is a Board 
certified orthopedic surgeon and is fellowship trained 
in spine surgery, 
(5) At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically 
utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures 
and neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss 
surgical microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and 
an older model Zeiss surgical microscope. At LDS 
hospital, the operating rooms are numbered sequentially 
for identification. The newer Zeiss and the Leica 
microscope are typically stored and ready for use in 
operating room number Four and operating room number 
Five. These two microscopes are equipped so that a 
surgical assistant has a binocular head directly across 
from the operating surgeon allowing him to have 
essentially the same surgical perspective as the 
operating surgeon. This provides a measure of 
increased safety for the patient and also allows a more 
comfortable environment for the operative assistant. 
These two microscopes are also equipped with superior 
optics and other features allowing a higher quality 
view and greater ease and flexibility for the surgeon 
and assistant during a surgical procedure. The older 
model Zeiss does not have these features and instead 
has an offset opposing headpiece that forces the 
assistant to be in an awkward position when she is 
assisting and does not allow for the same surgical 
perspective as the operating surgeon. It is generally 
a far inferior piece of equipment. 
(6) The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and 
utilized the operative microscopes for certain 
procedures when they were available in the normal 
course of his practice. These microscopes are owned by 
the hospital as capital equipment. On May 23rd, 2001 
the plaintiff had a surgical case scheduled in the LDS 
operating room. The Plaintiff's surgical case was 
scheduled in an operating room not typically utilized 
by the neurosurgical service. On that date there was a 
surgical microscope appropriate for the Plaintiff s 
needs physically located in another operating room 
where one of the defendants, Dr. Mark Reichman, was 
performing a neurosurgical procedure. Dr. Reichman was 
not using a microscope for the particular procedure he 
was performing. The Plaintiff asked Dr. Reichman if he 
was using the microscope in that operating room and if 
not, would he mind if the microscope was moved to 
another room so that the Plaintiff could use it. The 
microscopes are designed to be easily and safely moved 
from one place to another. Dr. Reichman asserted that 
the microscope was for neurosurgical procedures only. 
The Plaintiff pointed out that he wanted to use the 
microscope for a cervical spine fusion, a procedure 
commonly done as a neurosurgical procedure by 
neurosurgeons. Dr. Reichman then took the position 
that he had a proprietary interest in the microscope 
and that the microscope in the room he was operating in 
was for use by neurosurgeons only. He further asserted 
that use by non-neurosurgeons would lead to damage of 
the equipment and he suggested that the plaintiff buy 
his own microscope. 
(7) On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff sent a letter to 
Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of the operative 
microscope for certain procedures was in the interests 
of delivering the highest possible patient care and 
that it was also important for patient safety. The 
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the 
use of operative microscopes and qualified to do so. 
The letter requested Dr. Reichman to change his 
position as to who he thought could appropriately use 
this equipment. 
(8) Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this 
request and instead asserted to the operating room 
staff that he had the authority to restrict the use of 
the surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the 
neurosurgery division and that the Plaintiff was 
forbidden to use them. 
(9) Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty, 
the Chief of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact 
owned and controlled the operating room equipment at 
LDS Hospital. On July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with 
Dr. Doty to discuss the issue. At this meeting Dr. 
Doty confirmed that the surgical microscopes in the LDS 
Hospital operating rooms were owned by LDS Hospital and 
he indicated and that it would be acceptable and 
appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the surgical 
microscopes. 
(10) Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash, 
Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at 
LDS Hospital stating that "[t]he neurosurgery 
department is very busy and cannot provide adequate 
coverage for the neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if 
the microscopes are not available or being used by 
other services." He went on to state that the 
neurosurgeons would allow the Plaintiff the use of the 
older Zeiss microscope. He also went on to state that 
none of the neurosurgeons at LDS Hospital have any 
problem using this older Zeiss microscope when the 
newer Zeiss or Leica microscopes were not available. 
(11) On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting 
in the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a 
spinal surgery operation in operating room Five. 
Plaintiff was specifically waiting for Defendant Dr. 
Robert G. Peterson to finish his neurosurgical case in 
that room. After Dr. Peterson finished his case he 
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came into the lounge where the Plaintiff, a physicians 
assistant, and a otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon who 
Dr. Peterson was friendly with were sitting. Dr. 
Peterson had never met the Plaintiff before this and 
was therefore unaware of who he was. Dr. Peterson 
began talking to the ENT surgeon. He wanted to know if 
the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for his case. He 
encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the microscope from 
room Five for his ENT procedure so that the Plaintiff, 
who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure in 
Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not 
have it available for his case. He went on to state 
that he, himself, should "run that scope out" as "a 
banned surgeon" was following him in operating room 
Five. The Plaintiff overheard this and responded by 
going over to the Defendant and politely stating that 
he would like to introduce himself and that he was 
"Alan Brown, the banned surgeon." 
(12) On October 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff wrote to Dr. 
Doty agreeing to follow Dr. Reichman's August 1st, 2001 
suggestion that the Plaintiff use the older Zeiss but 
contingent on some modifications being made. These 
modifications consisted of replacing the offset 
assistant's head with an opposing head and upgrading 
some of the other features and optics. These 
modifications could be done if the hospital was willing 
to expend the money for those modifications. The 
Plaintiff suggested that it was reasonable for him to 
continue to use the new Zeiss and the Leica microscopes 
until the appropriate modifications were made. 
Plaintiff also agreed that his use would only be when 
these microscopes were not being utilized by the 
neurosurgery service and therefore there would be no 
conflict or patient safety issue. Additionally, the 
Plaintiff documented in this letter to Dr. Doty the 
incident with Dr. Peterson on September 17th. The 
Plaintiff pointed out that it seemed that the 
neurosurgery service was more interested in interfering 
with the Plaintiff's practice than from keeping all 
other services from using the microscopes as had been 
previously suggested by the Defendants. There was no 
written or verbal response to this letter. 
(13) From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the 
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope 
without apparent problems. Also during this time 
period Dr. Reichman continued to assert to the 
operating room staff that he had the authority to 
restrict access to the surgical microscopes in an 
attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using 
this equipment. 
(14) On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to 
Dr. Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and 
disassembled the newer Ziess and/or the Leica 
microscope(s). Defendants argued that as a result of 
the Plaintiff's causing a "generalized disrepair" of 
the microscopes, treatment of neurosurgery patients had 
been compromised and operating room time and stress had 
increased. Defendants continued to maintain that they 
had a right to restrict access to the microscopes 
Plaintiff wanted to use. A copy of this letter was 
sent to Dr. Doty and to the Dusty Clegg, R.N., 
Department Manager for the operating rooms. The 
Plaintiff was not sent a copy of this letter. 
Plaintiff denies the truth of the allegations in this 
letter and is unaware of any documentation or proof of 
the allegations in this letter. 
(15) On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient 
scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The 
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests 
of quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled 
surgical assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica 
microscope was optimal. The modifications to the older 
Zeiss microscope had still not been done. When the 
Plaintiff came to the operating room he was told that 
Defendants were insistent that he could not use the 
newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes. This was despite 
the fact that at least one of these microscopes was 
available for use on that day as was one of the 
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was 
located. Plaintiff asked what his options were and 
called Dusty Clegg to request a suggestion on how to 
best handle the problem. Dusty Clegg recommended that 
Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was 
unproductive to call hospital administration. The 
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Plaintiff called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he 
wanted to use one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman 
had restricted. Dr. Reichman, without discussion, 
refused to change his assertion that the Plaintiff did 
not have Dr. Reichman's permission to use the 
microscopes. Plaintiff called Dr. William Hamilton, 
Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central Region, to 
explain the situation in brief. Dr. Hamilton, after 
some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff 
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the 
microscope in question. Plaintiff felt uncomfortable 
using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled 
the procedure. 
(16) The following day the Plaintiff called Dr. 
Hamilton requesting information and clarification on 
what happened the previous day. Dr. Hamilton 
apologized for the outcome and said that the hospital 
was dependent on the neurosurgical service to provide 
level one trauma care and also that the hospital was 
currently in negotiations with Dr. Reichman regarding 
the issue of neurosurgical coverage for trauma. He at 
1 O 
no time stated that Dr. Reichman had the authority to 
restrict access to the microscope nor did he state that 
any of the allegations made by the Defendants regarding 
damaged or disassembled equipment were true or even 
documented. 
CLAIMS 
(1) From May 23rd, 2001 through the present, 
Defendants have used unprofessional and unethical 
conduct with the intent to interfere with the 
economic relations of the Plaintiff in violation 
of Utah Code 58-1-501 (2) (a), 58-1-501 (2) (b), and 
58-67-501(1)(c)(i). 
(2) By misrepresenting his authority and intimidating 
the Plaintiff and the LDS Hospital operating room 
staff as well as hospital administrators, 
defendant Dr. Mark Reichman has practiced and 
attempted to practice his occupation using actions 
and communications which are false, misleading, 
deceptive and fraudulent in violation of Utah Code 
Section 58-1-501(2)(h). 
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(3) Defendants have engaged in a pattern of activity 
including directly and indirectly intimidating 
others through actions and/or omissions with the 
intent to interfere with the Plaintiff's economic 
relations by wrongfully restricting access to 
essential hospital equipment for an improper 
purpose and through improper means causing injury 
to the Plaintiff. 
(4) The Defendant's malicious intent and unlawful 
methods will not support an affirmative defense of 
privilege, 
(5) Even if the Defendant's acts were not for the 
purpose of interfering with the Plaintiff s 
economic relations or even if the Defendants did 
not desire to interfere with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations, the Defendants knew that 
interference was substantially certain to occur as 
a result of their actions and as a necessary 
consequence thereof, the interference was 
intentional. 
(6) Witnesses and documents will establish clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the Defendants are the result of willful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or 
conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of the Plaintiff as required for punitive 
damages pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-18-
K D (a) . 
Demands: 
(1) Plaintiff requests relief in the amount of 
$18,296.50 representing actual damages. 
(2) Plaintiff requests the Court award punitive 
damages and the costs of this suit and such 
further relief as the Courts sees fit. 
(3) Plaintiff requests permission to add parties and 
causes of action at a later date consistent with 
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evidence adduced through discovery. 
(4) Plaintiff requests any additional damages accrued 
as a result of the Defendant's continued unlawful 
actions and omissions. 
(5) Plaintiff requests injunctive relief against 
future actions and/or omissions by the Defendants 
that would result in unlawful interference with 
the Plaintiff's economic relations. 
Dated July 29th, 2002. 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Attorney, acting for himself: 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT 
PETERSON, M.D. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
DEFENDANT PETERSON'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT 
Civil No. 020906986 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Defendant, Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson"), has moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to dismiss the Complaint of Alan Brown, M.D. ("Dr. Brown") 
pro se, on the grounds that the allegations do not state a claim against him. Alternatively, Dr. 
Peterson moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
This action arises from plaintiffs desire to use a particular microscope in a surgical 
procedure. Dr. Brown seeks actual damages of $ 18,296.50 for unspecified economic injury, punitive 
damages and injunctive relief. 
In the Complaint, the sole allegation against Dr. Peterson is that he once referred to Dr. 
Brown as a "banned surgeon", a reference to Dr. Brown's use of a particular microscope used by 
other surgeons. Plaintiff alleges that because he could not use a microscope of his choosing in 
surgery, Dr. Peterson has "intended" to interfere with Plaintiffs prospective economic relations and 
somehow damaged Dr. Brown.1 Dr. Brown cryptically alleges that the Defendants, both 
neurological surgeons, "have engaged in a pattern of activity including directly and indirectly 
intimidating others through actions and/or omissions with the intent to interfere with Plaintiffs 
economic relations by wrongfully restricting access to essential hospital equipment for an improper 
purpose and through improper means causing injury to the Plaintiff." Complaint at 13. Further, 
defects in the pleadings are revealed by Dr. Brown inconsistently claiming that "even if the 
Defendant's [sic] acts were not for the purpose of interfering with the Plaintiffs economic relations 
. . . the interference was intentional. Complaint at 14. 
Distilled to its essence and given the very most liberal construction to his pleadings, Dr. 
Brown complains that, because he is not able to use a particular microscope in surgery, he has been 
damaged. Dr. Brown concedes that other microscopes, although allegedly "inferior" were available 
for his use. Complaint at 2, 3. Nonetheless, because he could not use a particular microscope, the 
defendants have intended to interfere with his economic relations. 
Utah law does not recognize the tort of "intent" to interfere with prospective economic 
relations but, rather, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Dr. 
Brown concedes that even though Dr. Brown may not have actually interfered with Dr. Brown's 
prospective economic relations, the interference was intentional. Complaint at 14, f 5. Having 
conceded that there was no actual interference with Dr. Brown's actual economic relations, under 
1
 The microscopes in question are owned by the hospital as capital equipment. Complaint at 4. 
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the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 
(Utah 1982), the Complaint is defective and must therefore be dismissed. 
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is 
liable for tortious interference with business relationships if the plaintiff proves "(1) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) 
for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." A party is subject 
to liability for an intentional interference with present contractual relations if he intentionally and 
improperly causes one of the parties not to perform the contract. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
766 (1979). St Benedict's Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 201 
(Utah 1991). Conspicuous by its absence is any factual allegation that Dr. Brown intentionally or 
otherwise unlawfully caused Dr. Brown to not perform any contract or otherwise interfered with any 
economic relationship as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet and St. Benedict's Development 
Company Co. Distilled to its essence, Dr. Peterson commented that Dr. Brown was a "banned 
surgeon" and could not use a particular microscope. Dr. Brown admits that after this single 
comment on September 17, 2002, that "from October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002, the Plaintiff 
utilized the Leica and newer Ziess microscope without apparent problems." Complaint at 9. 
Thereafter, the pleadings are absent as to any other reasonable inference that Dr. Peterson committed 
any unlawful act or other breach of duty allegedly owed to Dr. Brown. There is simply no allegation 
in the Complaint that defendant interfered with any contract or economic relationship. Plaintiff, a 
medical doctor, does not specify how his economic relations were affected or whether patients were 
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ill-served by anything that defendant did or didn't do.2 As trite as it may seem, Dr. Brown does not 
have, and has not alleged, that he has a contractual right to use any particular microscope. Dr. 
Brown recites that he petitioned hospital administration about the dispute but that there has been "no 
written or verbal response[s]" to his letter. Complaint 9. Presumably, his damages are the cost of 
a new microscope. If not, then the pleadings give insufficient particularity for Dr. Brown to frame 
a responsive pleading other than a motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiffs complaint is also defective because he has no standing to bring claims under Utah 
Code Ann Section 58-l-501(2)(a), (2)(b)b and 58-67-50l(c)(i). Proceedings for alleged 
unprofessional or unethical conduct is exclusively the duty of Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing under Chapter 58 of the Utah Code. Plaintiff has no standing to allege 
violations of Utah law in this civil action. 
CONCLUSION 
With undisputed Utah law and precedent dictating what actions may be lawfully addressed 
in this state's courts, Dr. Brown's allegations against Dr. Peterson are defective as a matter of law. 
Dr. Peterson should not have to defend against such defective and trivial accusations. Plaintiff has 
failed to satisfy the requirements of Utah law and accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint falls short of 
stating a claim for tortious interference with economic relations and may be properly dismissed. 
Without more, no claim for interference with economic relations can lie and Dr. Peterson's Motion 
to Dismiss may be granted. 
2
 Plaintiff alleges that on July 2,2002, ten (10) months after the "banned surgeon" comment, he "felt 
uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled the procedure." Complaint 
at 12. Plaintiff does not allege whether this alleged cancellation caused any damages, whether the 
procedure was later rescheduled nor does he allege how Dr. Peterson (or any other person) 
improperly interfered with the surgical procedure. 
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DR. PETERSON'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION 
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 
Alternatively, Dr. Brown should be required to make a more definite statement under Rule 
12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE how {and if) any Defendant actually and 
intentionally interfered with the Plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations; (2) clarifying 
the improper purpose or by improper means employed by any Defendant; and (3) how the Plaintiff 
was injured as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. The Plaintiff should also 
clarify his claims for relief which indiscriminately refer to "Defendant's" action without any 
reference to a particular Defendant. See, e.g., Complaint at 13. ("The Defendant's [sic] malicious 
intent and unlawful methods will not support an affirmative defense of privilege.") 
Plaintiffs complaint fails to give sufficient detail or notice to Dr. Peterson so he can frame 
a responsive pleading or craft discovery to defend against the allegations in the complaint. If the 
complaint if not dismissed for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff should give a more definite statement 
as to the claims he makes against Dr. Peterson. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 2002. 
PARSONS, DAVJES, KINGHORN^? PETERS 
^_4J———— —— 
Ha#ld L. Reiser 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
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Alan B. Brown (#7693) 
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FILES DISTRICT COURT 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert 
Peterson, M.D. 
Defendants 
Memorandum Supporting Default 
Entry and Against Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's 
Motion for a More Definite Statement 
Case No. 020906986 
The Honorable Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod 
Plaintiff had a constable properly serve the Defendant with 
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons on July 23rd, 2002. On 
August 15th, 2002 Defendant Robert Peterson had still failed 
to answer and so Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment 
pursuant to URCP 55(a)(1). On August 23rd, 2002 Defendant 
moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Claim pursuant to URCP 12(b)(6) 
on the grounds that the Plaintiff's allegations do not state 
a Claim. In the alternative, Defendant made a Motion for a 
More Definite Statement. 
I. Defendant's Motion is Barred as Defendant Has Failed 
to Plead as Required by URCP 12(a) 
A, FACTS 
Defendants Dr. Mark Reichman and Dr. Robert Peterson 
were personally served by a constable on July 23rd, 2001 with 
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons as required under URCP 4. 
Proof of Service, a copy of the Claim and Ten Day Summons has 
been filed with the Court as required under URCP 3(a). An 
Amended Complaint was filed with the Court and served upon 
the Defendants on August 29th, 2002. Robert Peterson, M.D. 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as required by URCP 12(a) 
until after August 16th, 2002. Pursuant to URCP 55(a)(1), 
Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment against defendant Dr. 
Robert Peterson on August 15th. 
B. ISSUE 
URCP 60(b) provides in part that on motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. Defendant Robert Peterson 
discussed the Complaint with his partner and co-defendant 
Mark Reichman. Dr. Reichman emphasized to Dr. Peterson that 
they needed separate counsel and that the Complaint needed 
to be answered. Dr. Peterson is a Board certified 
Neurosurgeon with extensive education and training. 
Defendant Peterson's failure to plead in a timely manner 
indicates indifference to the legal process and therefore 
does not entitle him to relief under URCP 60(b). 
II. Plaintiff's Response to Request for a More Definite 
Statement and Defense that His Complaint States a 
Claim for which Relief Could be Granted. 
A. FACTS: 
The Defendants are both licensed physicians 
specializing in the practice of neurosurgery. Both 
Defendants maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendants are also partners 
acting under the business name Neurosurgical Associates, 
L.L.C. Defendant Dr. Mark Reichman, is the Chief of the 
Neurosurgery Division at LDS Hospital. The Plaintiff is a 
licensed physician specializing in orthopedic surgery and 
who also maintains active staff privileges at LDS Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the normal course of their 
respective businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are 
competitors for certain types of surgical patients seeking 
treatment for spinal disorders. 
The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC 
Health Plans. This contract requires that the Plaintiff 
maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain Health Care 
facility and also requires that certain patients with IHC 
Health Plan medical insurance be treated at an IHC 
contracted hospital such as LDS Hospital. The contract 
between IHC Health Plans and the Plaintiff also provides 
generally that the Plaintiff will provide surgical services 
for IHC Health Plans' beneficiaries in exchange for IHC 
Health Plans paying for those services. The Plaintiff has 
continued to maintain active staff privileges at LDS 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically 
utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures and 
neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss surgical 
microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and an older model 
Zeiss surgical microscope. The Defendant's have never 
disputed that the Leica and newer Zeiss microscopes are 
superior in quality to the older Zeiss. These superior 
quality makes certain surgical procedures safer for the 
patients and more comfortable for the surgeon and the 
surgical assistant. 
The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and 
utilized the operative microscopes for certain procedures 
when they were available in the normal course of his 
practice. These microscopes are owned by the hospital as 
capital equipment. On May 23rd, 2001 the plaintiff had a 
surgical case scheduled in the LDS operating room. Dr. 
Reichman indicated that the Plaintiff was not allowed to use 
either of the two newer microscopes as they were for the 
exclusive use of the Defendants and the other members of the 
Neurosurgery Division as well as neurosurgery resident 
physicians in training. On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff 
sent a letter to Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of 
the operative microscope for certain procedures was in the 
interests of delivering the highest possible patient care 
and that it was also important for patient safety. The 
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the use 
of operative microscopes and qualified to do so. The letter 
requested Dr. Reichman to change his position as to who he 
thought could appropriately use this equipment. 
Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this 
request and instead asserted to the operating room staff 
that he had the authority to restrict the use of the 
surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the neurosurgery 
division and that the Plaintiff was forbidden to use them. 
Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty, the Chief 
of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact owned and 
controlled the operating room equipment at LDS Hospital. On 
July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with Dr. Doty to discuss 
the issue. At this meeting Dr. Doty confirmed that the 
surgical microscopes in the LDS Hospital operating rooms 
were owned by LDS Hospital and he indicated and that it 
would be acceptable and appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the 
surgical microscopes. 
Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash, 
Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at LDS 
Hospital stating that xx[t]he neurosurgery department is very 
busy and cannot provide adequate coverage for the 
neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are 
not available or being used by other services." This 
letter also states that "[t]he neurosurgeons have met in 
this regard and the opinions are unanimous." Defendant 
Robert Peterson's name is on the letterhead indicating that 
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he was acting in concert with Dr. Reichman on this issue. 
On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting in 
the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a spinal 
surgery operation in operating room Five. Plaintiff was 
specifically waiting for Defendant Dr. Robert G. Peterson to 
finish his neurosurgical case in that room. After Dr. 
Peterson finished his case he came into the lounge where the 
Plaintiff, a physicians assistant, and a 
otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon with whom Dr. Peterson 
was friendly with were sitting. Dr. Peterson had never met 
the Plaintiff before this and was therefore unaware of who 
he was. Dr. Peterson began talking to the ENT surgeon. He 
wanted to know if the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for 
his case. He encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the 
microscope from room Five for his ENT procedure so that the 
Plaintiff, who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure 
in Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not have 
it available for his case. He went on to state that he, 
himself, should "run that scope out" as "a banned surgeon" 
was following him in operating room Five. The Plaintiff 
overheard this and responded by going over to the Defendant 
and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself 
and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon." 
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the 
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope 
without apparent problems. Also during this time period 
both of the Defendant's continued to assert to the operating 
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority 
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes- This was a 
direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using 
this equipment. 
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr. 
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and 
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s). 
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's 
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes, 
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and 
operating room time and stress had increased. Defendants 
continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict 
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use. The 
signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this 
letter. 
and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself 
and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon." 
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2Qd, 2002 the 
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope 
without apparent problems. Also during this time period 
both of the Defendants continued to assert to the operating 
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority 
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes. This was a 
direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using 
this equipment. 
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr. 
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and 
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope (s) . 
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's 
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes, 
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and 
operating room time and stress had increased. Defendants 
continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict 
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use. The 
signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this 
letter. 
On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient 
scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The 
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests of 
quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled surgical 
assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was 
necessary. When the Plaintiff came to the operating room he 
was told that Defendants were insistent that he could not 
use the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes. This was 
despite the fact that at least one of these microscopes was 
available for use on that day as was one of the 
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was 
located. Plaintiff asked Dusty Clegg, the operating room 
manager, what his options were and to request a suggestion 
on how to best handle the problem. Dusty Clegg recommended 
that Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was 
unproductive to call hospital administration. The Plaintiff 
called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he wanted to use 
one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman had restricted. 
Dr. Reichman, without discussion, refused to change his 
assertion that the Plaintiff did not have Dr. Reichman's 
permission to use the microscopes. Plaintiff called Dr. 
William Hamilton, Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central 
Region, to explain the situation in brief. Dr. Hamilton, 
after some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff 
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the microscope in 
question. Plaintiff felt that given the nature of the 
surgical procedure, in the interests of patient safety the 
case should be cancelled. 
The following day the Plaintiff called Dr. Hamilton 
requesting information and clarification on what happened 
the previous day. Dr. Hamilton apologized for the outcome 
and said that the hospital was dependent on the 
neurosurgical service to provide level one trauma care and 
also that the hospital was currently in negotiations with 
Dr. Reichman regarding the issue of neurosurgical coverage 
for trauma. He at no time stated that the neurosurgical 
division had the authority to restrict access to the 
microscope nor did he state that any of the allegations made 
by the Defendants regarding damaged or disassembled 
equipment were true or even documented. 
B. ISSUES 
1. Defendant Robert Peterson admits that Utah 
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law recognizes the tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations and cites Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).x 
Defendant Peterson asserts that Plaintiff's Complaint is 
defective because Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant 
Peterson intentionally interfered with any of the 
Plaintiff's contracts as required under Leigh Furniture.2 
The Court in Leigh Furniture (and similarly in Mumford v. 
ITT Commercial Finance Corp.3) recognized a common-law cause 
of action for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, and adopted the Oregon definition of 
this tort.4 Under this definition, in order to recover 
damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant 
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or 
by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.5 The 
Court also noted that privilege is an affirmative defense.6 
1
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement at 2. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
4
 Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982) 
5
 Id,, at 304. 
6
 Id. 
The tort of interference with economic relations 
is an intentional tort.7 Plaintiff will present evidence 
that will show that Defendant's intentionally interfered 
with the Plaintiff's existing and potential economic 
relations with his patients and their insurance company. 
This evidence will include documents and testimony that will 
prove that the Defendants wrongfully and unlawfully used 
their positions as the providers of neurosurgical services 
to LDS Hospital to intimidate the hospital, staff and 
administration with the specific intent to restrict the 
Plaintiff's use of certain equipment. Plaintiff will 
thereby satisfy the intent requirement under Mumford v. ITT 
Commercial Finance Corp8 and Leigh Furniture.9 
Plaintiff also intends to prove that the Defendants 
made fraudulent and misleading statements in order to 
further their goal of interfering with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations. The improper means element in Mumford 
is satisfied when "the means used to interfere with a 
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as 
7
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah) 
App. 1993). 
8
 Id. 
9
 Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 305 (Utah 1982). 
violations of statutes, regulation, or recognized common-law 
rules.10 Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves 
and hence are clearly ^improper' means of interference../'11 
"Commonly included among improper means are violence, 
threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation 
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging 
falsehood."12 Means may also be improper or wrongful because 
they violate "an established standard of a trade or 
profession."13 In the instant case, Defendant's have 
interfered with Plaintiff's practice in violation of Utah 
Code 58-1-501(2) (a), 58-1-501(2) (b), and 58-67-501(1) (c) (i) . 
They have also used intimidation and violated standards of 
the profession of medicine. The Plaintiff will prove that 
the improper means element is satisfied. 
Plaintiff asserts that under certain circumstances 
the equipment in question is vital to his economic relations 
in that it allows him to provide increased safety and a 
higher quality of care to his patients. As a direct result 
10
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 
and FN 11 (Oregon 1978). 
13
 Id., at 1371. 
of the Defendant's interference with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a 
surgical case thereby causing economic injury to the 
Plaintiff. 
2. Defendant Peterson, in his Motion to Dismiss, 
claims that Plaintiff conceded that there was no actual 
interference with the Plaintiff's economic relations.14 In 
fact, Plaintiff concedes nothing of the sort. Plaintiff 
merely points out that even if a Defendant does not act for 
the purpose of interfering or does not desire it but knows 
that the interference is substantially certain to occur as a 
result of a defendant's action and is a necessary 
consequence thereof, the interference is intentional.15 
URCP 8(e)(2) provides in part that "[a] party may set forth 
two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in 
separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are 
made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 
14
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 2. 
15
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of 
consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both.16 The Plaintiff's Complaint is not 
defective on the grounds that he conceded that there was no 
actual interference. Plaintiff's Complaint does not support 
this defense. 
3. Defendant Peterson claims that Plaintiff's 
pleadings are absent any reasonable inference that Defendant 
Peterson committed any unlawful act or other breach of duty 
allegedly owed to Dr. Brown.17 The Defendants are partners 
sharing various duties and responsibilities in a contractual 
relationship. Additionally, Defendant Reichman has 
indicated that his actions and allegations are supported by 
all of his partners and his assertions are representative of 
all the members of Neurosurgical Associates, L.L.C. 
Defendant Peterson is a member of Neurosurgical Associates, 
L.L.C. and his signature appears on a letter that 
1-7
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 3. 
fraudulently implies that Plaintiff caused damage to 
equipment and delay in patient treatment. Therefore, any 
actions that the Claim charges against Defendant Reichman is 
also imputed to Defendant Peterson. Additionally, 
Defendant's actions, including his statements to other 
physicians that Plaintiff was a banned surgeon and that the 
Defendant should physically remove a vital piece of 
equipment from an operating room in order to keep the 
Plaintiff from rightfully using that piece of equipment is 
consistent with the Plaintiff's allegations of 
unprofessional and unlawful behavior. Plaintiff has stated 
claims very particularly and very specifically against both 
of the Defendants. 
4. Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Complaint 
does not specify how his economic relations were affected or 
whether patients were ill served by anything that the 
Defendant did or did not do.18 Plaintiff was unwilling to 
subject a patient to unnecessary and increased risk by using 
an inferior piece of equipment when safer and higher quality 
equipment was available. Although the equipment was 
18
 Id. at 4. 
physically available, the Defendant's wrongful and unlawful 
actions directly and indirectly restricted the Plaintiff's 
access to this equipment. Therefore, in the interests of 
patient safety and quality of patient care, Plaintiff 
canceled a surgical procedure when the Defendant's 
interfered with his attempt at fulfilling his obligations 
under his contract with IHC Health Plans. Plaintiff's 
Complaint very specifically points out that as a direct 
result of the Defendant's interference with his economic 
relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a surgical 
case.19 The Defendant knew, or should have known that this 
result was a likely and necessary consequence of his 
actions. Defendant Peterson is in the business of providing 
surgical services to patients. Defendant Peterson is well 
aware of the economic consequences of canceling a scheduled 
surgical case. The claim by Defendant Peterson that there 
is no factual allegation that Dr. Peterson intentionally or 
otherwise unlawfully caused Plaintiff to not perform any 
contract or otherwise interfered with Plaintiff's economic 
relations is without merit. 
19
 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 12. 
5, Defendant Peterson has alleged that 
Plaintiff's Complaint is defective in that it gives 
insufficient particularity regarding damages.20 Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint specifies actual damages as $18,296.50. 
This amount represents the approximate surgical fee for the 
cancelled case. 
6. Defendant Peterson alleges that Plaintiff's 
Complaint is defective because he has no standing to bring 
claims under Utah Code Ann Section 58-1-501(2)(a), (2)(b), 
and 58-67-501 (a) (c) (i) . Plaintiff is not claiming that he 
has standing to bring action based on violations of these 
Code Sections. Plaintiff is merely pointing out that the 
Defendants have violated these Code Sections thereby 
supporting his claim that the Defendants have improperly (as 
defined in Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. 858 P.2d. 
1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993)) interfered with his economic 
relations. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
1. URCP 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to 
20
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 4. 
21
 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 15. 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is treated as one for summary judgment. 
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment 
requires that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.22 In a case of motion for 
summary judgment by the Defendant, the Plaintiff is 
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to him.23 Plaintiff has fairly and 
with specificity stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. There are many issues of material fact which 
would affect the outcome of this matter and so Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that Defendant's motion to dismiss 
is denied. 
2. Plaintiff has set forth his claims with 
specificity and particularity. Plaintiff's allegations 
are neither vague nor ambiguous. Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion for a 
More Definite Statement. 
22
 URCP 56(c) . 
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